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The Future Monitoring Role of GATT
in an International Arena of Non-Tariff
Barriers: A Proposal from a Law and
Economics Perspective
Andrew C. Blanar* and
Jean-Louis L. Arcand**
I. Introduction
The topic of this article, International Free Trade: GA TT's Pre-
sent Task of Monitoring Current and Future State Trade Re-
straints, will be addressed from a combined legal and economics per-
spective. While we are less than sanguine about the ability of the
formal legal enforcement structure of GATT to meet the challenges
of a post-Uruguay Round economic order, the basic problem lies as
much with the underlying economic theory upon which GATT's
goals and structures rest, as it does with the formal legal edifice.
The central purpose of this article is to present argument in
favor of a self-enforcement approach to the monitoring of non-tariff
barriers (NTBs), and to highlight the need for a GATT legal frame-
work to implement and support this revisionist perspective.
II. GATT: A Brief Overview
In effect there is no such thing as an international trade system.
The failure by participating countries to ratify all three pillars of the
system as proposed by the Havana Charter accounts for the system's
non-existence.' Although the General Agreement and the legal un-
B.A., University of Pittsburgh 1970, M.A., 1973, J.D., 1975; L.L.M., Cambridge
Univerity, 1986; Assistant Professor, GSPIA, University of Pittsburgh.
**B.A., Swarthmore College, 1985; M. Phil., Cambridge University, 1986.
Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
1. The Havana Charter was negotiated in Havana from November 21, 1947 to March
24, 1948. For a brief description of the Hanava Charter and its progeny, see J. JACKSON, J.
LOUIS AND M. MATSUSHITA, IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS
AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RULES, 1-2 (1984), reprinted in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT, (J. Jackson & W. Davey 2d
ed. 1986).
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derpinnings of the International Monetary Fund were ratified,2 the
failure to ratify the Havana Charter, and the International Trade
Organization that was its central component, has "[l]eft a vacuum in
the organization of economic relations in the post-war period."3
While this void is only partially filled, the provisions of the charter
on trade policy are "broadly taken up in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade which came into effect on January 1, 1948."1
The GATT poses a triple threat in that it simultaneously pro-
vides a legal framework for international trade relations, an organ
for conciliation and settlement of disputes, and a forum for trade
negotiations and for the adaptation of its legal framework. Since
GATT's genesis in 1945,' world trade has increased almost 1000
percent. Additionally, membership has increased from 23 to 122
countries.6 Moreover, the nature of world trade and the sharp dis-
tinction between countries labelled as "haves" and "have-nots" has
led to fundamental questioning of the "neo-liberal economic order
upon which GATT is founded." 7
It is argued that GATT's greatest challenge today is to over-
come its past success. As GATT enters its fifth decade the goal of its
preamble "the substantial reduction of tariffs" has been achieved.8
On the other hand, GATT has been less successful in addressing
problems concerning "other barriers to trade" and "the elimination
of discriminatory treatment in international commerce .
III. The Legal Framework of the GATT
The legal core of the GATT multilateral trade system consists
of substantive and procedure legal rules as found in the General
Agreement, plus separate legal agreements negotiated within the
GATT framework.
The basic limitations of the GATT legal system are in essence
twofold: technical and political. Technical limitations exist to the ex-
tent that complex political and economic relations are reduced to
general and specific legal rules. These details of legal implementa-
tion and application inevitably add friction to the system. Political
2. The previously established International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) provide a foundation for the implementa-
tion of a comprehensive international trade system.
3. 0. LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 1
(1987).
4. Id. at 2.
5. On the origins of GATT, see J.H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT, 35-
46 (1969).
6. 0. LONG, supra note 3, at 5.
7. Questioning has arisen in the developed, or first world, nations.
8. J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 535-56.
9. 0. LONG, supra note 3, at 5.
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limitations arise from the realization that legal reform of the GATT
system is hostage to an ever growing diversity of political and eco-
nomic interests that seriously differ from the original goals of the
GATT.
Exceptions to the basic legal framework of the GATT have in-
deed appeared. It must be remembered that knowledgeable observers
argue in favor of its adjustment to political reality. 10 Political real-
ism, actual as well as perceived, is never an end in itself. The princi-
ples of GATT may have to be modified in form if they are to main-
tain their substance. This is the nature of the challenge to the
GATT's legal structure, a structure that will now be examined.
The basic rules of the GATT's legal structure include: Article I
discusses the "most-favored nation" (MFN) treatment. Without a
doubt this is the most important general principle of GATT. How-
ever, it is one that even as applied to tariffs allows for exceptions.11
In general, the principle suggests that any privilege granted by coun-
try A to country B must be made available to all fellow member
states. National Treatment is discussed in Article III. Once a prod-
uct is imported into a country, it must, for internal tax and regula-
tory purposes, be treated similarly to equivalent domestic products.
Article IV prohibits most quantitative restrictions by the GATT, but
there are some exceptions.12 Article VII allows customs and duties
because, in part, they are easily identifiable. Reciprocity is defined in
the context of the GATT as being implicit within the basic core of
the Agreement.
These basic rules have survived early limitations. These include
the right to limit one's adherence to Part II (Articles III-XXIII) of
the General Agreement,13 and the failure to eliminate the customs
and duties exemption in 1955.14 Since 1966, however, attempts to
amend the form of the General Agreement have not been successful.
Any changes in GATT implementation over the past twenty years
have taken place outside the formal legal framework of the GATT,
without amending the General Agreement itself.
These changes include the growth of customs unions and free
trade areas, preferential treatment for developing countries,1" the ac-
10. 0. LONG, supra note 3, at 8. Article XIV, Customs unions and free trade areas;
Article XXV:5 allowing non-compliance if approved by GATT parties; Article XX, public
policy, Article XXI, security, and Article 1:2, allowing for the continuation of pre-GATT pref-
erences. It should be obvious that these exceptions are major ones.
11. Exceptions include some agricultural and fisheries imports, Article XI:2; restrictions
to reduce balance of payment difficulties, Articles XII and XVIII; and cases involving less
developed countries (LDCs), Article XVIII.
12. For example, the Protocol of Provisional Application of 1947 is an exception.
13. The GATT Review Session of 1955.
14. Even though a new Part IV discussing Trade and Development was added to the
GATT in 1955, customs and duties were still exempted.
15. GATT arts. 18, 36-38.
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cession of non-market economies to GATT,"6 the nonacceptance of
the idea of reciprocity by some LDCs,17 and a myriad of creative
limitations18 to the MFN principle. When coupled with the natural
lack of cohesion caused by separate bilateral agreements within the
formal system, these changes have led to a new "legal" tolerance of
pragmatic deviation. This tolerance bodes little good for the contin-
ued survival of the spirit of universal multilateralism embodied in
the General Agreement.
It is not clear whether this means that the multilateral era of
GATT is over or is merely catching its breath. Thus, as a result of
the tendency of the current GATT system to avoid confronting fun-
damental contradictions for fear of conflict, it is contended that what
remains is an empty basket. As yet this is not the condition of the
GATT multilateral trade system. The Uruguay Round may prove
successful, but the original GATT ideal is facing its most serious
crisis since its inception.19
IV. Self Enforcement Approach to Regulating Non-tariff Barriers
A. Underlying Premises of Self-enforcement
Fundamental self-enforcement approaches include the following
premises: First, the theory of international trade which constitutes
the analytical foundation for the GATT is flawed and obsolete, and
is becoming increasingly irrelevant, and a potential source of confu-
sion in an NTB-based era of international trade restraints.2" This
view of Neoclassical trade theory is espoused by a large number of
international economists. Second, the "New International Econom-
ics"21 and particularly its game theoretic elements 2 can provide the
basis for a self-enforcement approach to confront trade restrictions. 3
Third, the most-favored nation approach (MFN), especially when
16. See GATT art. 17; J. JACKSON, supra note 1, ch. 14.
17. H.R. NAU, DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE URUGUAY ROUND 1, 21-22 (1989).
18. See infra note 40.
19. For a more sympathetic evaluation, see 0. LONG, supra note 6, at 17-19.
20. See infra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
21. In traditional international trade theory, comparative advantage played the pre-emi-
nent role in giving rise to trade. The New International Economics adds increasing returns as
a result, and since increasing returns are difficult to integrate into the traditional perfectly
competitive model, calls upon the tools of Industrial Organization. As such, the New Interna-
tional Economics can perhaps best be described as a concerted effort to integrate International
Economics and Industrial Organization.
22. Recent applications of the game-theoretic approach to traditional concerns of inter-
national economists include BRANDER & SPENCER, Export Subsidies and Market Share Ri-
valry, 18 J. INT'L ECON. 83 (1985), in the area of export policy, and HWANG & MAI, On the
Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas Under Duopoly: A Conjectural Variations Approach, 24 J.
INT'L EcON. 373 (1988), which breaks new ground on the perennial tariff versus quota debate.
23. The "New International Economics" is most often associated with the work of Paul
Krugman and Elhanan Helpman; see P. KRUGMAN & E. HELPMAN, MARKET STRUCTURE AND
FOREIGN TRADE (1985).
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formally unconditional, inevitably encounters the problem of
detectability.
In light of these premises, an alternative approach to the multi-
lateral trading system is proposed. The current system focuses on the
detection and swift, but still neutrally determined, adjudication and
punishment of suspected transgressors. This approach contrasts with
the existing goal of sure adjudication and severe penalties. In large
part, the current system has been successful in practice because of
the inherent nature of tariff barriers. The barriers are formulated in
written form and must be decipherable by their administrators.
Moreover, they are usually comprehensible to outsiders. As such, ap-
plication of a strict, legalistic standard of proof to violations of the
strictures of the GATT is both proper and enforceable.
B. "Sub"-standard of Proof and Self-enforcement Mechanics
The problem confronting the GATT-based system of multina-
tional trade relations today can in essence be reduced to the issue of
the continuing practicability of applying the current standard of
proof to NTB-type trade barriers transgressions. The common law
system of adjudication allows for two standards of proof. Criminal
law requires a higher standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt." The
civil law demands judgment based upon a "preponderance of the evi-
dence." The actual standard of proof utilized within the GATT sys-
tem clearly is not the criminal or civil law standard. It is closer,
however, in practice to that of the criminal law standard.
Accordingly, the time has arrived for the formulation of both a
new standard of proof and an enforcement mechanism to meet the
challenges of the emerging NTB-oriented trade era of the 1990s. A
standard of proof that builds upon a "preponderance of the evi-
dence" approach of the civil law is proposed. This standard is
presented in the context of a self-enforcement mechanism suggested
by simple game-theoretic arguments.2" This approach is more in line
with the realities of the international trading environment based
upon legal and economic principles than upon the current system.
C. Law and Economics - A Joint Perspective
Students of international trade, whether they be international
lawyers, economists or government policy makers, must be aware of
24. For a formal treatment of game theory, one may consult one of several leading texts
on the subject. See generally, J. FRIEDMAN, GAME THEORY WITH APPLICATIONS TO ECoNOM-
ICs (1986); H. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS (1957); H. MOULIN, GAME THEORY
FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1982). For the non-specialist reader, perhaps the best introductory
treatment is to be found in J. TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, ch. 11
(1988).
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the perspectives of their colleagues from other disciplines.2 It is our
firm belief that the future of international free trade is particularly
dependent upon a combination of the resources from the legal and
economic professions. Such a joint-venture attempts to relate current
economic thought pertaining to the problems of international trade
and the concerns of the international trade lawyers seeking explana-
tions for their changing professional environment. This method will
enable international lawyers to devise legal rules and enforcement
mechanisms that work in practice as well as in theory, especially in
an era where NTBs have replaced tariffs as the restriction of
choice.26
V. The Limitations of the Economic Theory Supporting GATT
Scitovsky argued that a future GATT must be designed to avoid
the mutually disadvantageous Cournot-Nash solution 7 of countries
seeking to maximize national welfare through trade restrictions with-
out allowing retaliation by others." What Scitovsky understood in
1942 was that an organization was needed which could assist the
international community in avoiding the mutually disadvantageous
outcome that would necessarily arise out of the unregulated work-
ings of the international market. GATT has yet to fulfill this role.
A. Strategic Interaction Defeats the Invisible Hand
The well-known Prisoner's Dilemma, which illustrates interna-
tional trade self-regulation, involves two suspects who are arrested
and charged with a crime. 9 The suspects are held in separate cells
and are prevented from forging an iron-clad cooperation agreement.
The District Attorney separately offers each prisoner the chance to
turn state's evidence, i.e., to convict the other prisoner. The jail sen-
tence received by each prisoner as a function of their decisions are
represented most simply in the following bimatrix: the length of the
25. Thus in parts 11 and III of this article, background on GATT and the role of law in
the GATT system is provided.
26. The authors are working on a study of the recent U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agree-
ment and its impact as a matter of law and economics on GATT. They are also working on a
proposed study on the promise and peril implicit in the internationalization of American
business.
27. See generally, J. TiROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1988). As
Tirole puts it, the Nash equilibrium concept is the "basic solution concept" in game theory.
The theory applies to circumstances in which a player cannot increase his payoff by engaging
in an alternative course of activity because of the action of his competitors. The player's pre-
sent activity becomes his equilibrium action.
28. For a recent example of the application of game-theoretic arguments to the GATT
process, see RE. BALDWIN, and R.N. CLARKE, GAME MODELLING THE TOKYO ROUND OF
TARIFF REDUCTIONS (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 1588,
1985).
29. See any introductory game theory text (for example, R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES
AND DECISIONS (1957)) for a formulation and more rigorous treatment of this classic problem.
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Prisoner Mum (1,1) (5,0)
2 Fink (0,5) (4,4)
If both confess, they each receive a sentence of four years. If both
refuse to confess, they would both receive a one year sentence be-
cause of insufficient evidence. However, if one implicates the other
and the other has not done the same, the confessing prisoner is re-
leased, while the unfortunate "good-natured" prisoner faces five
years of imprisonment.30
The astute reader will immediately find that each prisoner pre-
fers to confess, no matter what the other prisoner does. In game-
theoretic parlance, this is expressed by saying that each player's
"dominant strategy" is to fink.
This simple example can be recast in the following international
trade setting. Two countries attempt to agree on the elimination of
all tariffs which hamper trade between them. If they both refrain
from cheating on the agreement, they both receive the well-known
benefits of free trade. In the terms used in the original example, each
would receive the short 1 year sentence. If one country imposes trade
restrictions on the other, and the second country does not respond in
kind, the first, implicating country benefits, while the other country
loses. It is well-known from traditional trade theory that the efficient
outcome in which world welfare is maximized is that of free trade in
which there are no restrictions. This arises in a perfectly competitive
situation in which the Invisible Hand"1 is left to its own devices. The
simple Prisoner's Dilemma argument applied to this situation illus-
trates, however, that such an outcome is not attainable. Further, the
dilemma illustrates that the Cournot-Nash solution involves a subop-
timal outcome in which trade restrictions persist because of the ra-
tional strategic concerns of the two countries. Thus is Adam Smith's
mighty Invisible Hand felled by Augustin Cournot's strategic
interaction.
It is easy to understand why strategic considerations have be-
come an increasingly important part of contemporary international
30. For the standard surveys of the pure theory of international trade, see Mundell, The
Pure Theory of International Trade, 47 AMERICAN ECON. REV. 67-110 (1960), Bhagwati, The
Pure Theory of International Trade: A Survey, 33 ECONOMETRICA, 477-519 (1965-66), or
Jones and Neary, The Positive Theory of International Trade, in I HANDBOOK OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMICS (R.W. Jones & P.B. Kenen eds. 1984).
31. The reader is referred to A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
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trade theory. Traditionally, the pure theory of international trade
has been approached from one of four directions: Ricardian compar-
ative advantage,32 the crude exchange model,33 Hecksher-Ohlin fac-
tor proportions" theory and the specific-factors model. 35
B. Two Limitations of the Traditional Approach
There are many limitations to these traditional approaches, but
for the purposes of this article it suffices to discuss only two of them.
First, traditional theories of international trade have always been
less than satisfactory as policy tools, particularly because of their
lack of robustness at the empirical level. Second, there is a widely
held view that international trade policy is increasingly concerned
with the division of a shrinking international pie.
Today, very few individuals, even economists, are willing to ac-
cept the unqualified beauty of free trade. In 1947, Joan Robinson
wrote:
The popular view that free trade is all very wellso long as
all nations are free-traders, but that when other nations erect
tariffs we must erect tariffs too, is countered by the argument
that it would be just as sensible to drop rocks into our harbours
because other nations have rocky coasts . . . . [W]hen the game
of beggar-my-neighbor has been played for one or two rounds,
and foreign nations have stimulated their exports and cut down
their imports by every device in their power, the burden of un-
employment upon any country which refuses to join in the game
will become intolerable and the demand for some form of retali-
ation irresistible. The popular view that tariffs must be answered
by tariffs has therefore much practical force, though the ques-
tion still remains open from which suit in any given circum-
stances it is wisest to play a card. (emphasis supplied)"0
32. The Ricardian model stresses the role of technological differences as the basis for
trade, although it does allow a role for demand-side factors.
33. The exchange model concentrates on the demand side and is useful as a vehicle for
discussing the stability of the international trade equilibrium and the determination of the
terms of trade. The first issue was raised by J. HICKS, VALUE AND CAPITAL (1939); the second
by Samuelson, The Transfer Problem and Transport Costs: The Terms of Trade When Im-
pediments Are Absent, 62 ECON. J. 278-304 (1952).
34. The Heckscher-Ohlin model, focuses on "differences between countries in their rela-
tive factor endowments and on differences between commodities in the intensities with which
they use these factors." R. JONES & P. KENEN, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIcs 14
(1984). The Heckscher-Ohlin model is particularly notable in that it offers an explicit treat-
ment of the effects of trade on the internal distribution of income.
35. The specific factors model differs from the Heckscher-Ohlin model in its assump-
tions about the mobility of factors of production among sectors. This difference in assumptions
is sufficient for the results to be appreciably diffirent from those of the Heckscher-Ohlin
model. For an introduction to this class of models, see Jones, A Three Factor Model in
Theory, Trade and History, in J. BHAGWATI, TRADE, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, AND GROWTH:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER (1971).
36. JOAN ROBINSON, ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT (2d ed. 1947).
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The game-theoretic terms speak for themselves."a The concept
of the tariff negotiation process is a game which goes back much
further to Torrens, Mill, Sidgwick and Bickerdike,3 a although it was
largely neglected by the main corpus of international trade theory
cast in the Neoclassical mold. What is also interesting in Robinson's
words, however, is the question from which "suit" it is best to pick
one's retaliatory action. During the past 20 years, and especially
since the virtual elimination of tariffs as important barriers to trade
(to a large extent a product of the Tokyo Round),39 the answer to
this question has consisted of two words: Non-Tariff Barriers. "'
VI. The Challenges Facing the GATT System: An Elementary
Game-Theoretic Approach
Nations can switch from easily monitored tariffs to "covert pro-
tectionism" in the form of various ingenious combinations of NTB's
as trade barriers become increasingly difficult to regulate. Given this
development, it is essential for GATT to formulate rules to regulate
such behavior. These rules must satisfy a number of institutional
constraints imposed by the particular environment in which GATT
must operate.
First, the new rules must specify a set of criteria according to
which a country would be deemed to be in accordance with or in
violation of the GATT charter. Second, these criteria must be rela-
tively simple, and must not entail an enormous commitment of bu-
reaucratic resources by GATT. Third, given that the GATT has not
37. Note that Von Neuman and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behav-
ior had been published in 1944. It was only much later that this theory was applied to ques-
tions of international trade. For recent examples of the New International Economics, in addi-
tion to Krugman and Helpman (1985), supra note 23, see H. KIERKOWSKI, MONOPOLISTIC
COMPETITION AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1984) and A. DIXIT, STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF
TRADE POLICY (1986).
38. In Economics, "Neoclassical has become a term synonymous with 'mainstream.'"
The approach was codified in rigorous mathematical terms in Paul Samuelson's monumental
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1947). The Ricardian model focuses on production
and on the changes in resource allocation when trade is opened up.
39. "The Tokyo Round negotiation of 1973-79 was the seventh and largest of a postwar
series of GATT multilateral negotiations." G.R. WINHAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE
TOKYO ROUND NEGOTIATION xi (1986).
40. The economics literature on NTBs is growing. A representative sampling of the
main strains in the literature includes R. BALDWIN, NON-TARIFF DISTORTIONS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE (1970); Deardorff & Stern, Methods of Measurement of Non-Tariff Barriers
(1985) (unpublished manuscript, University of Michigan). Finger, Hall & Nelson, The Politi-
cal Economy of Administered Protection in 72 AM. ECON. REV. (1984); Lowinger, Discrimi-
nation in Government Procurement of Foreign Goods in the US and Western Europe, 42 S.
ECON. J. (1976); R. MIDDLETON, NEGOTIATING ON NON-TARIFF DISTORTIONS OF TRADE
(1975); Nogues, Olechowski & Winters, THE EXTENT OF NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO IMPORTS
OF INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES (World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 789, 1986); Roningen &
Yeats, Non-tariff Distortions of International Trade, Some Preliminary Empirical Evidence,
112 WELWIRTSHCAFTLICHES ARCHIV. (1976); Winters, Negotiating the Abolition of Non-
Tariff Barriers, 39 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS (1987).
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been vested with effective supranational powers enabling it to police
its own rules, the criteria must be largely self-enforcing, with
GATT's role being restricted essentially to that of a monitoring
agency.
The distinguished economist and pioneer thinker on interna-
tional trade issues, Jacob Viner, saw things much in the same way
when he wrote that:
[E]ven if agencies could be established to enforce a code of
rules, no one seems as yet to have discovered even the elements
of a possible pattern for such a code which would have some
logic, be reasonably fair to most parties under most circum-
stances, be simple enough to be administrable, and be accept-
able to countries which feel themselves to be possessed of rela-
tively strong bargaining power."'
It -would be unrealistic to pretend to offer specific answers to
questions that experts could not resolve. Relatively recent develop-
ments in the theory of games, such as those presented by Jacob
Viner, however, do offer the "elements of a possible pattern for such
a code," and certainly offer the logic that is needed to resolve the
issue at hand. Arguments suggesting game-theoretic analysis and ap-
plication in the international arena provide a starting point for a
solution.
A. Some Elementary Game-Theoretic Arguments
Attempts to bring elementary game-theoretic arguments to bear
on the GATT monitoring issue begs the question of why Neoclassi-
cal trade theory has failed to provide cogent suggestions of its own.
For the student of the Neoclassical international economics litera-
ture, the answer is obvious to the point of being tautologous. With
the exception of the optimal tariff literature, Neoclassical interna-
tional trade theory has ignored strategic issues which involve the in-
teraction of a small number of actors. This strategic interaction is, of
course, the behavior that GATT policy is supposed to be designed to
regulate.
There is, however, a second question. The "New International
Economics," inspired by the Industrial Organization (10) Renais-
sance42 (itself generated by the introduction of Game Theory to 10)
is not a new phenomenon. Why then has its influence not been ex-
41. Viner, International Relations Between State-Controlled National Economies, 34
AM. ECON. REV. 315-29 (1944).
42. The Industrial Organization Renaissance is generally held to have begun in the
1970's and consisted in a rapid expansion in the theoretical literature in the field, fueled by the
application of game-theoretic techniques. For a comprehensive survey of the "state of the art"
of the field, see generally, TIROLE, supra note 27; R. Schmalensee & R. Willig, Handbook of
Industrial Organization (unpublished manuscript).
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tended to the international policy arena? Further, why has it been
conspicuous by its absence in the GATT forum? An answer can best
be found in an oft-cited sentence from the concluding pages of
Keynes' General Theory:
Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are proba-
bly distilling their frenzy from the writings of some long-defunct
academic scribbler .4
Without suggesting that the authors of international trade legisla-
tion, and in particular the authors of the GATT charter and the va-
rious amendments to it, are "madmen," it is believed that they are
"in authority," and that they are "practical men." 4" As such, they do
indeed distill their "frenzy," or, wisdom, from the writings of old-
fashioned Neoclassical economists. Given that economically-moti-
vated suggestions for reform of GATT rules rest on the intellectual
foundation of a largely outdated school of economic thought, it is
hardly surprising that they have failed to provide satisfactory
answers.
B. Super-Games
The elementary lessons drawn from super-game theory can best
be illustrated by an extension of the simple Prisoner's Dilemma
game.' Consider the same example as above, in which the two coun-
tries are negotiating the removal of trade restrictions, in which both
countries have an incentive to cheat. In this case, however, the game
is repeated several times in succession. Extension to an intertemporal
context has several important consequences. First of all, and as
shown rigorously by a number of recent abstract theoretical papers,
any outcome, and in particular the outcome in which both prisoners
cooperate, can be supported as a Nash equilibrium.' This suggests
that, given a number of pre-conditions, both countries in the simple
trade restriction 47 game considered above can eliminate tariffs.
Moreover, such behavior will be individually rational. In other
words, the cooperative outcome will be self-enforcing as being in the
interests of all, thus supporting the utility of the so-called "Folk
Theorems.'
48
43. J.M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 383
(1936).
44. Id.
45. See D. Abreu, Repeated Games with Discounting (1983) (Ph.D. dissertation); Be-
noit & Krishna, Finitely Repeated Games, 53 ECONOMETRICA 905-22 (1985); Fudenberg &
Maskin, The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting and with Incomplete Infor-
mation 54 ECONOMETRICA 533-54 (1986).
46. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
47. See supra note 45.
48. The name "Folk Theorem" stems from the fact that the basic theorem has been
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The precondition for this result is the existence of adequate
"punishment strategies" which ensure compliance with the coopera-
tive outcome. A "punishment" in super-game terminology consists of
actions inflicted by all the players participating in the game on a
player who deviates from the cooperative agreement. A "punish-
ment" for a country that attempts to cheat by raising its tariffs uni-
laterally, allows the other country to do precisely the same to the
deviating country. Such punishment will continue until the gain that
accrued to the deviant from cheating is completely wiped out and
turned into a loss.
The purpose of these possible punishments is to deter a potential
cheater from deviating from the cooperative outcome in the first
place. For this threat to be credible, the potential deviant must be-
lieve that the other countries will punish him if he does indeed cheat
on the agreement. To ensure that this potential deviant does take the
threat seriously, it is also necessary that a country that refuses to
punish a cheater be himself punished. Such an argument can be car-
ried forward ad infinitum until the initial desire to cheat is com-
pletely neutralized by the certainty of severe punishment that will
follow a deviation. The concept of the credibility of threats forms the
crux of one of the most productive innovations to game theory in the
last two decades: the concept of "subgame-perfection." '49
The existence of credible threats is sufficient to deter deviation
from the cooperative outcome in which trade barriers are disman-
tled. These threats do not depend upon the existence of an interna-
tional policeman for their enforcement. It is in the individual interest
of each participant in the international trading system for them to be
credible. As long as these threats are credible, they need never be
carried out. This suggests the roles that GATT should really be
playing: a monitoring agency which attempts to detect when cheat-
ing is occurring and a coordinating agency that ensures that the re-
sponse of the international community to a nation deviating from the
cooperative outcome be appropriately severe. Thus, there is neither a
reason for GATT to play the role of an international policeman, nor
a need to attempt the Herculean task of vesting it with such supra-
national powers.
This does not indicate that GATT is without a role to play in an
NTB oriented system of trade restrictions, but only that the legal
known for quite some time to game theory practitioners but was never attributed to any one
author. Various versions of the Folk Theorem are, however, associated with J. Friedman. See,
J. FRIEDMAN, GAME THEORY WITH APPLICATIONS TO ECONOMICS (1986).
49. See Selten, Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrage-
tragheit, 12 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESANTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT 301-24 (1965); and also
Selten, Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive
Games, 4 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY 25-55 (1975).
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framework for the conduct of trade relations and the formal enforce-
ment mechanism will not be as directly intertwined as they have
been in the past. Dispute settlement procedures must be adapted to
meet the challenge of a self-enforcement approach that is not re-
stricted in its methods by the obsolete formal mechanisms of the
tariff-based past. 0
The lessons learned by students of the criminal justice system
support the arguments advanced by economic game theory, as well
as those lessons derived from "common sense." A swift, sure and
measured response to transgressions is more effective as a deterrent
to such activity than a more severe, but less certain one. If the sanc-
tions imposed are also seen as procedurally fair, though imperfect,
the total effect will be a system of enforcement of practical norms
that will be acceptable to all concerned. 5
This is the situation facing GATT as it attempts to adapt to the
challenges of an NTB-based era of increasing restrictions on im-
ports. It is asserted that what superficially appears to be an unlikely
source of conceptual and practical assistance, the experience of the
criminal justice system with deterring illegal activity, can be a useful
source of ideas for a self-enforcement approach to dealing with
NTBs.
VII. The Problem of Detectability: Optimal Trigger Mechanisms52
When a deviator faces a credible threat on the part of the inter-
national community, then the cooperative outcome of free trade (or
at least freer trade) will be self-enforcing. If, however, detecting
cheating is a problem, one is brought back to the initial discussion of
the increasing prevalence of NTBs, whose presence is extremely diffi-
cult to detect.
Suppose that an exporting country, Us, experiences a large de-
cline in the demand for a particular class of products it exports to a
foreign country, Them. Suppose also, national economies being what
they are, the Them economy is at the same time subject to business
cycles, periods of boom being associated with strong demand for im-
ports from Us, and periods of bust with weaker demand for imports
50. A detailed discussion of the structure of the legal regime of a self-enforcement ap-
proach will be dealt with in a later work. On the GATT procedure for dispute settlement, see
K. DAM, THE GATT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 335-36 (1970).
51. J. WILSON & R. J. HERNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 397-403 (1985) and on
crime, deterrence and economic choice, Sullivan, The Economics of Crime: An Introduction to
the Literature, 19 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 138-49 (1973); and Stigler, The Optimal Enforce-
ment of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526-36 (1970). For a formulation and more rigorous treat-
ment of this classic problem see, R.D. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS (1957).
52. The title of this section derives from a game-theoretic Industrial Organization paper
by Porter, Optimal Cartel Trigger Price Strategies, 30 J. ECON. THEORY 313-38 (1980),
which constructs an optimal rule for maintaining a producers' cartel.
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from Us. The decrease in the demand for the products exported by
Us could therefore be the result of low demand in Them, due to a
cyclical downturn, the imposition of a tariff, quota, or other explic-
itly detectable trade restriction by Them, the imposition of an unde-
tectable NTB by Them, or all of the above in various combinations.
It is clear that the problem facing policymakers in Us is one of
"signal extraction." For example, one must extract the cause from a
harmful result such as the fall in the demand for its exports. If an
explicit tariff or quota is not in evidence as the main culprit, the
problem of disentangling the resulting possibilities remains. If, after
factoring out legitimate causes, such as cyclical and other
macroeconomic phenomena, the decline in the demand for its exports
is still not accounted for, it seems reasonable for Us to believe that it
has been subject to covert NTB measures. Deciding which causes
are legitimate and what imputed level of NTB intervention consti-
tutes a violation of the cooperative agreement, is the monitoring role
to be played by GATT.
Agreeing to such a set of measures is not likely to be an easy
task for negotiators. The rules governing when a country is in viola-
tion of the agreement would be for the most part straightforward.
These measures do not involve the complex measuring costs of pro-
duction in different countries. They involve assessing the historical
patterns of demand for a particular country's exports, estimating
what demand should be at a particular time, factoring out those ele-
ments which cause realized demand to differ from expected demand,
and thus arriving at a rough assessment of whether or not an NTB
has been in effect during the period in question. In order to reduce
the margin of error involved, these computations will be supple-
mented with additional sources on the prevalence of NTB's. There is
still some question as to whether these investigations of hidden pro-
tectionism, investigations that GATT is already well-equipped to
handle, should be biased in one direction or the other.
Surprisingly, the answer is in the affirmative. Tests of violation
of the cooperative agreement should be biased in such a way that
more violations are found than exist in reality. In light of the super-
game arguments presented above, the purpose of this bias should be
obvious. It is to ensure that no cheating country goes unpunished
even if this means punishing a number of innocent parties. Bias in
the opposite direction would be disastrous, as it would weaken the
credibility of the threat of punishment.
VIII. Proposed Standard of Proof and Deterrence Rationale
Unlike the Anglo-American theory of criminal responsibility
which is based on a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof
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as well as a "just deserts" rationale for punishment, our approach to
NTB offenses is predicated upon a lower and more readily achieva-
ble standard of proof and is justified on a deterrence rationale." A
deterrence rationale is less concerned with justice in an individual
determination of a violation than with the overall effect of a finding
on the actual and potential transgressions of the rights of others.
While a self-enforcement approach may not meet the strict stan-
dards of proof required by our system of criminal justice, it is con-
tended that such a standard is not necessary for policing and punish-
ment duties within a system governing international trade relations.
Under this proposed reform of the GATT system, countries will
be punished briefly and occasionally for deviations from free trade
they have not committed. Thus, such deviations simply arise out of
the uncertainty prevalent in the international trading environment
and their domestic economies. Periods of cooperation in which trade
flows freely will be interspersed with periods in which relatively inno-
cent players on the international scene will be subject to punishment.
While this may appear to be "cutting off one's nose to spite one's
face," the unfair punishment of a very restricted number of countries
some of the time and for very brief periods pales in comparison with
all countries effectively punishing each other even more harshly for-
ever - which is the situation we are faced with now and which will
persist indefinitely if action is not taken. Periodic vaccination with
diluted protectionism, a vaccination which ensures that no country
contracts the disease, is therefore needed to quell the epidemic.
IX. International Free Trade and the Most-Favored Nation
Principle
International free trade can arise as a self-enforcing equilibrium
if the monitoring issue is resolved, a set of criteria under which be-
havior defined as constituting a violation of the rules is developed,
and adequate punishment of culprits can be devised. In the
meantime, and in the belief that the three preceding issues can and
will be resolved only in the long run, it is worth considering whether
current goals espoused by GATT are steps in the direction of freer
trade or instead constitute barriers to such progress. The cornerstone
of the GATT agenda is the unconditional Most Favored Nation
Principle" and it is therefore to this policy prescription that we now
turn.
53. It is our position that the likelihood of some errors in the assignation of NTB viola-
tions in a self-enforcement mechanism can be alleviated in its unjust effect by a reduction in
the severity of the sanction. A quest for perfect justice is an impossible one and that is a major
weakness of the current approach.
54. GATT art. 1.
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The unconditional "Most Favored Nation (MFN) Principle" is
enshrined in Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), which states: "any advantage, favor, privilege or im-
munity granted by a contracting party to any product originating in
or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the
territories of all other contracting parties."55 The issue at hand is
whether the unconditional MFN principle leads to greater trade lib-
eralization or whether it is in fact a barrier to the dismantling of
protectionism. A simple thought exercise illustrates why the answer
is not so clear-cut.
Consider three countries who have granted MFN status to each
other and who are negotiating over tariff reductions. Under the un-
conditional MFN, two countries reaching a bilateral accord to re-
duce tariffs to a given level must grant the same reduction in tarrifs
to the third country with which they both have an MFN agreement.
Does the third country have any incentive to enter into negotiations
with the other two? A priori the answer would seem to be "no,"
because the MFN clause creates an "externality." The benefit of the
agreement concluded between the first two countries accrues to the
third country, regardless of the fact that it did not participate in the
negotiations and did not agree itself to any such tariff reductions.
One may then ask whether the first two countries will ever find it in
their interest to conclude an agreement. As noted by Cooper: "MFN
creates the possibility of 'free-riders' on any trade negotiation, and
with the number and economic importance of countries now mem-
bers of the GATT having increased sharply, this free-rider aspect
may well stifle further progress toward trade liberalization." 5
With the preceding comments in mind, it is perhaps surprising
that in his well-known textbook, Ethier (1983) claims that "[s]ince
the MFN clause implies that bilateral agreement will have direct
multilateral consequences, the multilateral approach to negotiation is
much more efficient (emphasis supplied).15 7 Bhagwati (1983), notes
that there is little disagreement about the "intrinsic desirability" of
MFN.5 Wolf (1983) notes that the MFN rule is a tool for bringing
about "maximum trade liberalization. 59
It seems that Ethier et al are implicitly positing some process
55. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947, as amended), see J. JACKSON & W.
DAVEY, PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 4 (2d ed. 1986).
56. See Cooper's paper in W. CLINE, TRADE POLICY IN THE 1980s 735 (1983).
57. W. ETHIER, MODERN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 228 (1983).
58. BHAGWATI, supra note 30, at 730.
59. He does argue, however, in favor of bringing selectivity into Article XIX of the
GATT. See Wolff, The Need for New GATT Rules to Govern Safeguard Actions, in TRADE
POLICY IN THE 1980S 366 (W.R. Cline ed. 1983).
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which leads the world onto a Pareto-improving path, or at least a
path along which tariffs are falling. Furthermore, this process de-
pends on the unconditional MFN clause. Very little theoretical re-
search has been done in this area, although some exploratory work
has been carried out by Ai and Arcand (1987).'o In their model, in
which it is assumed that the unconditional MFN rule is strictly ad-
hered to, a sequence of bilateral trade negotiations can, under cer-
tain reasonable conditions, lead to a worldwide general reduction in
the level of trade restrictions.
While the Ai and Arcand study is certainly not conclusive proof
that bilaterialism in conjunction with the unconditional MFN leads
to free trade, it does suggest that criticisms of the GATT's uncondi-
tional MFN rule based on the "free-rider" argument may be mis-
guided, and that the unconditional MFN may indeed be an institu-
tional mechanism which leads to greater world efficiency. It also
suggests that eschewing the bilateral approach, with its proven track
record of modest successes, such as the recent U.S.-Canada agree-
ment, in favor of a global multilateral approach riddled with ques-
tion-marks, is at best an uncertain proposition, or at worst a counter-
productive one.
X. Conclusion
While the MFN Clause in Article I of the General Agreement
remains the formal central core of the structure of the current world
trade system, the increasing reliance by GATT member states on
sophisticated non-tariff approaches to restraining imports has
changed the operational ethos and methods of that system. The
MFN approach of Article I of the General Assembly has led to an
integrated system of international trade. Although it is not as suc-
cessful as originally hoped, it has accomplished many of its basic
goals within a tariff-based international trading system. To a large
extent the growth of NTB's can be traced to the general success of
the GATT approach in reducing tariffs. The rise of alternative barri-
ers to trade and the renewed interest in bilateral trade agreements
also reflect the end of that era which saw the emergence of GATT.
A system that can work in an NTB based trade environment
can help preserve the essential principle of GATT: mutual universal
reciprocity. In this light it is posited that a self-enforcement ap-
proach such as the one presented in this article remains the most
practical, albeit limited, approach to be followed within the original
philosophy, if not within the formal mechanisms of GATT.
60. Ai, & Arcand, Does the Unconditional Most Favored Nation Principle Lead to
More Efficient International Bargaining Outcomes? (1987) (unpublished manuscript, Depart-
ment of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
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